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+.\"	$NetBSD: RSA_public_encrypt.3,v 1.5 2026/04/08 17:06:46 christos Exp $
+.\"
+.\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*-
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v6.0.2 (Pod::Simple 3.45)
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ========================================================================
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text
+.ft CW
+.nf
+.ne \\$1
+..
+.de Ve \" End verbatim text
+.ft R
+.fi
+..
+.\" \*(C` and \*(C' are quotes in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
+.ie n \{\
+.    ds C` ""
+.    ds C' ""
+'br\}
+.el\{\
+.    ds C`
+.    ds C'
+'br\}
+.\"
+.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el       .ds Aq '
+.\"
+.\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for
+.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index
+.\" entries marked with X<> in POD.  Of course, you'll have to process the
+.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
+.\"
+.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'.
+.de IX
+..
+.nr rF 0
+.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1
+.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{\
+.    if \nF \{\
+.        de IX
+.        tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+..
+.        if !\nF==2 \{\
+.            nr % 0
+.            nr F 2
+.        \}
+.    \}
+.\}
+.rr rF
+.\"
+.\" Required to disable full justification in groff 1.23.0.
+.if n .ds AD l
+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "RSA_public_encrypt 3"
+.TH RSA_public_encrypt 3 2026-04-07 3.5.6 OpenSSL
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH NAME
+RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt \- RSA public key cryptography
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+.Vb 1
+\& #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+.Ve
+.PP
+The following functions have been deprecated since OpenSSL 3.0, and can be
+hidden entirely by defining \fBOPENSSL_API_COMPAT\fR with a suitable version value,
+see \fBopenssl_user_macros\fR\|(7):
+.PP
+.Vb 2
+\& int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+\&                        unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+\&
+\& int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+\&                         unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+.Ve
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+Both of the functions described on this page are deprecated.
+Applications should instead use \fBEVP_PKEY_encrypt_init_ex\fR\|(3),
+\&\fBEVP_PKEY_encrypt\fR\|(3), \fBEVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex\fR\|(3) and
+\&\fBEVP_PKEY_decrypt\fR\|(3).
+.PP
+\&\fBRSA_public_encrypt()\fR encrypts the \fBflen\fR bytes at \fBfrom\fR (usually a
+session key) using the public key \fBrsa\fR and stores the ciphertext in
+\&\fBto\fR. \fBto\fR must point to RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) bytes of memory.
+.PP
+\&\fBpadding\fR denotes one of the following modes:
+.IP RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 4
+.IX Item "RSA_PKCS1_PADDING"
+PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
+However, it is highly recommended to use RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING in
+new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW.
+.IP RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
+.IX Item "RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING"
+EME\-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA\-1, MGF1 and an empty
+encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
+.IP RSA_NO_PADDING 4
+.IX Item "RSA_NO_PADDING"
+Raw RSA encryption. This mode should \fIonly\fR be used to implement
+cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
+Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
+.PP
+When encrypting \fBflen\fR must not be more than RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 11 for the
+PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 42 for
+RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
+When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
+\&\fBRSA_public_encrypt()\fR will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
+and therefore the ciphertext will be different each time, even if the
+plaintext and the public key are exactly identical.
+The returned ciphertext in \fBto\fR will always be zero padded to exactly
+RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) bytes.
+\&\fBto\fR and \fBfrom\fR may overlap.
+.PP
+\&\fBRSA_private_decrypt()\fR decrypts the \fBflen\fR bytes at \fBfrom\fR using the
+private key \fBrsa\fR and stores the plaintext in \fBto\fR. \fBflen\fR should
+be equal to RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) but may be smaller, when leading zero
+bytes are in the ciphertext. Those are not important and may be removed,
+but \fBRSA_public_encrypt()\fR does not do that. \fBto\fR must point
+to a memory section large enough to hold the maximal possible decrypted
+data (which is equal to RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) for RSA_NO_PADDING,
+RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes and
+RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 42 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING).
+\&\fBpadding\fR is the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data.
+\&\fBto\fR and \fBfrom\fR may overlap.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+\&\fBRSA_public_encrypt()\fR returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e.,
+RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR)). \fBRSA_private_decrypt()\fR returns the size of the
+recovered plaintext. A return value of 0 is not an error and
+means only that the plaintext was empty.
+.PP
+On error, \-1 is returned; the error codes can be
+obtained by \fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
+.SH WARNINGS
+.IX Header "WARNINGS"
+Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information
+which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
+design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
+.PP
+In OpenSSL before version 3.2.0, both the return value and the length of
+returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
+Since version 3.2.0, the default provider in OpenSSL does not return an
+error when padding checks fail. Instead it generates a random
+message based on used private
+key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn\*(Aqt have to implement
+a side\-channel secure error handling.
+Applications that want to be secure against side\-channel attacks with
+providers that don\*(Aqt implement implicit rejection, still need to
+handle the returned values using side\-channel free code.
+Side\-channel free handling of the error stack can be performed using
+either a pair of unconditional \fBERR_set_mark\fR\|(3) and \fBERR_pop_to_mark\fR\|(3)
+calls or by using the \fBERR_clear_error\fR\|(3) call.
+.SH "CONFORMING TO"
+.IX Header "CONFORMING TO"
+SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3), \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3),
+\&\fBRSA_size\fR\|(3), \fBEVP_PKEY_decrypt\fR\|(3), \fBEVP_PKEY_encrypt\fR\|(3)
+.SH HISTORY
+.IX Header "HISTORY"
+Both of these functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
+Copyright 2000\-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+.PP
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.