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diff --git a/static/freebsd/man4/mac_lomac.4 3.html b/static/freebsd/man4/mac_lomac.4 3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 276778db..00000000 --- a/static/freebsd/man4/mac_lomac.4 3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ -<table class="head"> - <tr> - <td class="head-ltitle">MAC_LOMAC(4)</td> - <td class="head-vol">Device Drivers Manual</td> - <td class="head-rtitle">MAC_LOMAC(4)</td> - </tr> -</table> -<div class="manual-text"> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="NAME"><a class="permalink" href="#NAME">NAME</a></h1> -<p class="Pp"><code class="Nm">mac_lomac</code> — - <span class="Nd">Low-watermark Mandatory Access Control data integrity - policy</span></p> -</section> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="SYNOPSIS"><a class="permalink" href="#SYNOPSIS">SYNOPSIS</a></h1> -<p class="Pp">To compile LOMAC into your kernel, place the following lines in - your kernel configuration file:</p> -<div class="Bd Pp Bd-indent"><code class="Cd">options MAC</code> -<br/> -<code class="Cd">options MAC_LOMAC</code></div> -<p class="Pp">Alternately, to load the LOMAC module at boot time, place the - following line in your kernel configuration file:</p> -<div class="Bd Pp Bd-indent"><code class="Cd">options MAC</code></div> -<p class="Pp">and in <a class="Xr">loader.conf(5)</a>:</p> -<div class="Bd Pp Bd-indent Li"> -<pre>mac_lomac_load="YES"</pre> -</div> -</section> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="DESCRIPTION"><a class="permalink" href="#DESCRIPTION">DESCRIPTION</a></h1> -<p class="Pp">The <code class="Nm">mac_lomac</code> policy module implements the - LOMAC integrity model, which protects the integrity of system objects and - subjects by means of an information flow policy coupled with the subject - demotion via floating labels. In LOMAC, all system subjects and objects are - assigned integrity labels, made up of one or more hierarchical grades, - depending on their types. Together, these label elements permit all labels - to be placed in a partial order, with information flow protections and - demotion decisions based on a dominance operator describing the order. The - hierarchal grade field or fields are expressed as a value between 0 and - 65535, with higher values reflecting higher integrity.</p> -<p class="Pp">Three special label component values exist:</p> -<table class="Bl-column Bd-indent"> - <tr id="Label"> - <td><a class="permalink" href="#Label"><b class="Sy">Label</b></a></td> - <td><a class="permalink" href="#Comparison"><b class="Sy" id="Comparison">Comparison</b></a></td> - </tr> - <tr id="low"> - <td><a class="permalink" href="#low"><code class="Li">low</code></a></td> - <td>dominated by all other labels</td> - </tr> - <tr id="equal"> - <td><a class="permalink" href="#equal"><code class="Li">equal</code></a></td> - <td>equal to all other labels</td> - </tr> - <tr id="high"> - <td><a class="permalink" href="#high"><code class="Li">high</code></a></td> - <td>dominates all other labels</td> - </tr> -</table> -<p class="Pp">The “<code class="Li">high</code>” label is assigned - to system objects which affect the integrity of the system as a whole. The - “<code class="Li">equal</code>” label may be used to indicate - that a particular subject or object is exempt from the LOMAC protections. - For example, a label of - “<code class="Li">lomac/equal(equal-equal)</code>” might be - used on a subject which is to be used to administratively relabel anything - on the system.</p> -<p class="Pp">Almost all system objects are tagged with a single, active label - element, reflecting the integrity of the object, or integrity of the data - contained in the object. File system objects may contain an additional - auxiliary label which determines the inherited integrity level for new files - created in a directory or the alternate label assumed by the subject upon - execution of an executable. In general, objects labels are represented in - the following form:</p> -<p class="Pp"></p> -<div class="Bd - Bd-indent"><code class="Li">lomac/</code><var class="Ar">grade</var>[<var class="Ar">auxgrade</var>]</div> -<p class="Pp">For example:</p> -<div class="Bd Pp Bd-indent Li"> -<pre>lomac/10[2] -lomac/low</pre> -</div> -<p class="Pp">Subject labels consist of three label elements: a single (active) - label, as well as a range of available labels. This range is represented - using two ordered LOMAC label elements, and when set on a process, permits - the process to change its active label to any label of greater or equal - integrity to the low end of the range, and lesser or equal integrity to the - high end of the range. In general, subject labels are represented in the - following form:</p> -<p class="Pp"></p> -<div class="Bd - Bd-indent"><code class="Li">lomac/</code><var class="Ar">singlegrade</var>(<var class="Ar">lograde</var><span class="No">-</span><var class="Ar">higrade</var></div> -) -<p class="Pp">Modification of objects is restricted to access via the following - comparison:</p> -<p class="Pp"></p> -<div class="Bd - Bd-indent"><var class="Ar">subject</var>::<var class="Ar">higrade</var> - <span class="No">≥</span> - <var class="Ar">target-object</var>::<var class="Ar">grade</var></div> -<p class="Pp">Modification of subjects is the same, as the target subject's - single grade is the only element taken into comparison.</p> -<p class="Pp">Demotion of a subject occurs when the following comparison is - true:</p> -<p class="Pp"></p> -<div class="Bd - Bd-indent"><var class="Ar">subject</var>::<var class="Ar">singlegrade</var> - <span class="No">></span> - <var class="Ar">object</var>::<var class="Ar">grade</var></div> -<p class="Pp">When demotion occurs, the subject's - <var class="Ar">singlegrade</var> and <var class="Ar">higrade</var> are - reduced to the object's grade, as well as the <var class="Ar">lograde</var> - if necessary. When the demotion occurs, in addition to the permission of the - subject being reduced, shared <a class="Xr">mmap(2)</a> objects which it has - opened in its memory space may be revoked according to the following - <a class="Xr">sysctl(3)</a> variables:</p> -<p class="Pp"></p> -<ul class="Bl-bullet Bl-compact"> - <li id="security.mac.lomac.revocation_enabled"><var class="Va">security.mac.lomac.revocation_enabled</var></li> - <li id="security.mac.enforce_vm"><var class="Va">security.mac.enforce_vm</var></li> - <li id="security.mac.mmap_revocation"><var class="Va">security.mac.mmap_revocation</var></li> - <li id="security.mac.mmap_revocation_via_cow"><var class="Va">security.mac.mmap_revocation_via_cow</var></li> -</ul> -<p class="Pp">Upon execution of a file, if the executable has an auxiliary - label, and that label is within the current range of - <var class="Ar">lograde</var>-<var class="Ar">higrade</var>, it will be - assumed by the subject immediately. After this, demotion is performed just - as with any other read operation, with the executable as the target. Through - the use of auxiliary labels, programs may be initially executed at a lower - effective integrity level, while retaining the ability to raise it - again.</p> -<p class="Pp">These rules prevent subjects of lower integrity from influencing - the behavior of higher integrity subjects by preventing the flow of - information, and hence control, from allowing low integrity subjects to - modify either a high integrity object or high integrity subjects acting on - those objects. LOMAC integrity policies may be appropriate in a number of - environments, both from the perspective of preventing corruption of the - operating system, and corruption of user data if marked as higher integrity - than the attacker.</p> -<p class="Pp">The LOMAC security model is quite similar to that of - <a class="Xr">mac_biba(4)</a> and <a class="Xr">mac_mls(4)</a> in various - ways. More background information on this can be found in their respective - man pages.</p> -</section> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="SEE_ALSO"><a class="permalink" href="#SEE_ALSO">SEE - ALSO</a></h1> -<p class="Pp"><a class="Xr">mmap(2)</a>, <a class="Xr">sysctl(3)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac_biba(4)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac_bsdextended(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac_ddb(4)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac_ifoff(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac_mls(4)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac_none(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac_partition(4)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac_portacl(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac_seeotheruids(4)</a>, - <a class="Xr">mac_test(4)</a>, <a class="Xr">mac(9)</a></p> -</section> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="HISTORY"><a class="permalink" href="#HISTORY">HISTORY</a></h1> -<p class="Pp">The <code class="Nm">mac_lomac</code> policy module first appeared - in <span class="Ux">FreeBSD 5.0</span> and was developed by the TrustedBSD - Project.</p> -</section> -<section class="Sh"> -<h1 class="Sh" id="AUTHORS"><a class="permalink" href="#AUTHORS">AUTHORS</a></h1> -<p class="Pp">This software was contributed to the - <span class="Ux">FreeBSD</span> Project by Network Associates Labs, the - Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR - contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA - CHATS research program.</p> -</section> -</div> -<table class="foot"> - <tr> - <td class="foot-date">February 25, 2012</td> - <td class="foot-os">FreeBSD 15.0</td> - </tr> -</table> |